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My purpose in this essay is to explore religious 
experience and religious thought and the relation be-
tween the two, for how these two are conceived has an 
important bearing on how we understand the meaningful-
ness of religion and religious traditions. My starting 
point is Peter Berger's recent work. The Heretical 
Imperative (Anchor/Doubleday, 1980), in which he sum-
marizes the various strategies for pursuing theology 
and religious thinking in our contemporary situation. 
There Berger notes the following: 
This book is an argument, an exercise in relig-
ious thought, not a confessional document or a 
guide to religious experience. It is all the 
more important to keep in mind that religion is 
not primarily a matter of reflection or theor-
izing. At the heart of the religious phenomenon 
is prereflective, pretheoretical experience (33-
4; my emphasis). 
Here Berger sketches a view of religion, religious ex-
perience and religious thought that is not at all un-
familiar. Religious experience—what is called faith 
or "personal religion" by others and is characterized 
as the inner sense of overwhelming reality that comes 
from an encounter with what is sacred—is considered to 
be the heart and soul (the essence) of that phenomenon 
called religion. The assumption is that, since one 
need not be learned in the intricacies of theology, 
philosophy or ecclesiology in order to have it, faith 
clearly must be the common denominator among adherents 
to any particular religion (including the "founder" of 
the religion). Thus religious experience must be the 
core, the pure and simple origin that serves as the 
ground of all religious affirmations and thereby gives 
rise to tradition and reflection. Prior to all theor-
ies about it (123), religious experience posits its own 
authority beyond the relativities of history and mun-
dane experience (50), beyond all rationality (135), 
such that 
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the conviction that one has encountered God and 
heard his voice is not touched by the relativiza-
tions of historical consciousness. There are 
these encounters that carry within them an in-
trinsic conviction of truth. The individual can 
find certainty in this conviction. Even if he 
enters into the full gamut of historical and so-
cial scientific relativizations he can be confi-
dent that what has been experienced as truth by 
himself . . . will never come to be seen as unj 
truth (139; my emphasis). 
Here Berger re-enforces what we have said: religious 
experience is the secure and unassailable essence and 
presence of religion beyond the variations of time and 
tradition. Tradition and reflection are necessarily 
secondary phenomena, on the outside, "expressions" that 
are envigorated and given life (meaning) by religious 
experience. Even when it might be admitted that relig-
ious experience and its outward expressions form a sort 
of "dialectic," this is only to say that religious 
thought and language "color" religious experience it-
self. 1 Indeed, since they are "inevitably distortive" 
(49) in their reflection and representation of relig-
ious experience, tradition and reflection might be more 
properly called parasites which "feed off" their host, 
proximate to yet distant from religious experience, 
nearby yet wholly other. If we are to know the relig-
ion as it is, we must come to know religious experi-
ence; that is the key to understanding religion. 
As we have said, this view is not unfamiliar. For 
instance, in Christian theology over the last two cen-
turies we have seen the "feeling of absolute depen-
dence" as the essence of positive religion (Schleier-
macher), "subjective truth" (Kierkegaard), the gift of 
Word and faith as a given that precedes all tradition 
and reflection (i.e., empirical Christianity) (Barth), 
and "ultimate concern" with "Being itself" that may 
only be inadequately represented by symbols (Tillich). 
Today, it is a commonplace for texts in philosophy of 
religion to define their subject as a philosophical 
thinking about religion, i.e., a consideration of re-
ligious concepts and propositions from outside the re-
ligious realm. Philosophy of religion is then at best 
a second-order activity "at one remove from its subject 
matter." 1 Likewise, the popular "historian" of relig-
ion Wilfred Cantwell Smith makes the distinction 
between faith (one's inner experience or involvement 
with the transcendent) and the accumulated historical 
expressions and beliefs of a tradition (that "decorate 
or bespatter our world diversely") the cornerstone of 
his argument for the essential unity of and continuity 
between different faiths, and his project of a world 
theology. 1 Theologians such as Langdon Gilkey* and 
David Tracy* regularly appeal to an experiential or ex-
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istential level of religious life and community as the 
criterion for theological proposals, a level that pre-
sumably cannot be determined in advance by metaphysical 
construction or transcendental analysis. All these ex-
amples have at their foundation the same assumption 
that informs Berger's thought: religious experience or 
"faith" is the inner core, the fundamental datum of 
religion; tradition and reflection are outward expres-
sions or secondary realities. As we can see, this ap-
proach to religion is the basis for nearly every medi-
tation done today that attempts to take religion 
seriously, i.e., that acknowledges the unique claim of 
religion and therefore resists reducing it in toto to 
some other reality (e.g., society, psychology, his-
tory). In order to parry philosophers, social scien-
tists and others who criticize religion in light of its 
"rational," "cognitive," outward expressions, those who 
are sympathetic to religion (as in the case of these 
theologians and philosophers of religion) find them-
selves bound to remove religious experience and the en-
counter with the sacred from the contingencies of cul-
ture, language and the like. In this way one secures 
for religion a place among the valid and truthful ac-
tivities of human beings. 
Yet Berger's discourse (like that of others), de-
spite the references that we have cited to a pure and 
simple religious experience, spends little time on 
religious experience "as such." His concern, rather, 
is with the modern situation, our current historical 
and cultural setting in which there is an apparent lack 
of religious experience. His project is to help us 
with the "heretical imperative" put to us by our -situa-
tion, i.e., the necessity today of choosing some relig-
ious affirmation that makes sense from amidst a variety 
of possibilities presented to us. Chastising neo-
Orthodoxy (in the figure of Karl Barth) for attempting 
to ignore the modern situation with an affirmation of 
faith that is presumably not subject to history and 
human experience (61ff), Berger, following Schleier-
macher, urges on us an inductive method for affirming 
religion (114ff), one that explores the history and 
setting of religion—its symbolic expressions of 
experience—with all the tools of the historian and the 
social scientist. This is because religious experi-
ence, not being uniformly distributed and unable to be 
sustained over time (43), necessarily and inevitably 
comes to be "embodied" in tradition and reflectio.:. 
The latter, imbued with the authority of religious ex-
perience (44), serve as the "frozen memories," the 
signs and traces, which we must investigate in pursuit 
of religious experience, and by whose uncertain measure 
we must weigh the truth or falsity of the experience 
(135). 
This however means that religious experience is 
never present to us as such. Our very pursuit of it by 
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the inductive method invokes its absence, an absence 
that is forever with us since, according to Berger, one 
never fully attains one's goal (50). Infinitely defer-
red by being differed from itself in signs and traces 
(tradition and reflection), religious experience is 
emptied of its substance; the host has become ghost and 
guest, a haunting stranger amidst the relativities of 
time and culture through which we wander. What this 
means, however, is that, instead of being bracketed out 
of play (or paradoxically, by being bracketed out of 
play), religious experience is subject to and consti-
tuted by the interplay of language, thought and reality 
that is the movement of time, history and tradition. 
This play of the world, this movement, is "what" 
Jacques Derrida has called differance, the spacing and 
timing (differing and deferring) that "produces" the 
play of differences between things.' Differance names 
the co-origination of sign and signified, the implica-
tion of the sign in the signified. Berger has thought, 
true to his freely acknowledged phenomenological pre-
suppositions, that religion, to be meaningful and sig-
nificant, must have that meaning and significance lo-
cated in itself, present to itself, in some pure and 
simple ^transcendental signified" to which we point 
with signs and symbols. Yet unassailable and secure in 
itself, religious experience is in-significant to us by 
Berger's own account, for it is not sustained and does 
not last. It only becomes significant when it becomes 
its other, i.e., when it transfers its authority and 
becomes "embodied" in tradition and reflection. In 
other words, religious experience is only significant 
when it becomes sign, which is why it does not last and 
must become embodied in tradition and reflection. 
"From the moment that there is meaning there are noth-
ing but signs." T 
Put another way, the thing in itself (in this case, 
religious experience) is a sign;* religious experience 
must already be a sign, a trace, a text (all "meta-
phors" of exteriority in Derrida's analyses), in order 
to be meaningful and significant. For instance, it is 
Berger's argumentation, his religious thought, that de-
lineates, de-scribes and de-signates the importance of 
religious experience; religious experience is signifi-
cant as the pre-text for taking the historical "expres-
sions" of religion seriously. Religious experience, 
then, is not pure and simple; it is already written and 
traced, a "text" demarcated by tradition and reflection 
(religious thought) and thereby bound to them. Relig-
ious experience and religious thought--the "inside" and 
the "outside"--are indeed woven together, joined 
together, co-texts that form a con-text from which 
meaning emerges. (Berger admits as much when he notes 
that "the religious experience and the symbolic ap-
paratus mutually determine one another" (47 | ) . All of 
which is to say, following a practice of Martin Heideg-
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ger and Jacques Derrida,' that the i n s i d e ^ , the out-
side; religious experience 4^ religious thought. 
This destructive-deconstructive strategy of in-
scription and erasure (^) is a necessity in a situa-
tion such as this in which our (metaphysical) language 
is no longer adequate to describing the "relation" be-
tween religious experience and religious thought. Each 
is a text, an interpretation, of whatever is considered 
to be the matter at stake. The two then are the same; 
hence the "is." Yet these two do not form an indif-
ferent identity that reduces one to the other; each is 
outside the other and likewise encloses and is enclosed 
by the other, whereby it is impossible for us to tell 
which commands. To pass from one to the other is not a 
case of simple translation, a simple substitution of 
terms (as Berger himself indicated when, giving prece-
dence to religious experience, he called tradition and 
reflection "distortive"). A certain "violence" is in 
play between the two, with both inhabiting the other 
yet exceeding the other, each playing the role of para-
site and host in a strange sort of communion that binds 
them together. 1 0 Thus we are driven to "cross out" the 
"is" to avoid the metaphysical implications of substan-
tial identity that do not apply to these two "texts" 
that are more "activity" and "process" than thing. 
Religious experience and religious thought are the 
same, yet different; to pass from one to the other en-
genders a transformation, a movement of spacing and al-
terity that is the play of differences from which mean-
ing emerges. 
Some might suppose that this analysis confirms a 
dialectical relationship between religious experience 
and religious thought. Even those indebted (and presu-
mably dedicated) to the thinking of Heidegger and Der-
rida (e.g., Thomas J. J. Altizer, Nark Taylor, Paul 
Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer) 1 1 often draw heavily on a 
Hegelian-influenced dialectic in developing this line 
of thought, and in applying it to the matter of relig-
ion and religious thinking. Yet this "relationship" 
between religious experience and religious thinking is 
not a matter of unavoidable mediation and dialectic, 
and we would be remiss in so interpreting the destruc-
tive-deconstructive analysis above. In a dialectic 
(whether implicitly or explicitly) the negative, the 
other, is a resource for the full appropriation of 
meaning and realization of self-consciousness (self-
presence); the tension and violence between the "in-
side" and the "outside" is reconciled in an encompas-
sing unity that recaptures and reappropriates (i.e., 
takes back in) what has been expressed for an absolute 
self-consciousness. We have seen, however, that we do 
not have "positive" or "negative" terms here (as if 
either religious experience or thovight were more basic 
than the other) and that religious experience itself 
has been emptied, become a sign, in the movement and 
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play of differences. Instead of an Aufhebung that 
neatly closes the horizon of meaning, there is a going-
forth, an emergence, an "expenditure without reserve" 
in this "movement." 1* In this "movement" and "play" 
something is ventured, at risk; there is no certainty 
or assurance here. The seeds of meaning and truth are 
disseminated, scattered to the winds (so to speak), to 
bear fruit (or die) on the way. 
This analysis suggests a number of important conse-
quences for our understanding of religious experience. 
First, the traditional notion of religious experience 
(or some correlate) as an ultimate and authoritative 
"court of appeal" for justification of particular re-
ligious assertions is an empty notion; it is a "wheel 
that does no work," as Wittgenstein might say. This is 
because (and this is our second point) religious "ex-
perience," in some way yet to be decided, always has 
been thoughtful and "thinking," emerging as it does 
from the tradition and reflection of its time. For in-
stance, the Buddha's "experience" of enlightenment un-
der the Bodhi tree was a thoughtful meditation that 
considered the thinking and tradition of his time and 
laid out and argued for a different interpretation 
[Auslegung] of the way things are. Likewise, Jesus' 
"faith" and "experience" of God was a consideration of 
the "logical" (though radical) implications of the 
meaning of God as his tradition understood Him (right-
eous, good, helping, saving), and his life and deatli 
was an attempt to demonstrate (i.e., to show, prove, 
explain) this understanding of God. Even the mystic. 
(East or West), the epitome of the emphasis in religion 
on experience, is involved in thinking about the "True 
Self" or one's right relation to God, and finds himself 
compelled to lay out (i.e., interpret—German auslegen) 
in word and deed whatever knowledge he obtains. In all 
these cases, and in any others we may wish to cite, 
"experience" has been taking cognizance of one's situa-
tion, thinking about the questions and answers given to 
one by the tradition and which have helped shape one's 
"experience," and then risking an answer that tries to 
make sense of, and tries to show, the way things are. 
Religious experience therefore has not, is not and can-
not be a safe haven from the relativities of history 
and culture, but must be a venture out into the world, 
a journey (cf. Er-fahrung in German) that lets meaning 
shine forth in its demonstration of how things are, a 
demonstration that opens up the four corners of th-a 
world (Heidegger's Geviert, the "fourfold" of earth, 
sky, divinities and mortals, that is hinted at with the 
"crossing out" of the "is" ( B ^ H t a ) ) 1 ' whereby what is 
divine is encountered. Of course, if this is so, then 
the experience is open to elaboration, interpretation, 
rebuttal and contradiction. Indeed, this—our third 
point—is perhaps the most important point we are 
making: religious "experience" not only emerges from 
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the tradition and reflection of its time, such that it 
is already a "thinking," but religious "experience" is 
also constituted and made real by the interpretation 
and "thinking" that comes later. In other words, 
religious "experience," as a venture out into the 
world, is significant in the process of thinking about 
that "experience," and makes sense only in being 
interpreted. This of course is the risk and adventure, 
that religious "experience" is both questionworthy and 
questionable, and thereby subject to the intertextual-
ity of the play of the world. We cannot say that 
"modes of experience in themselves cannot contradict 
each other" 1* and thereby avoid the clash of ideas 
among the religions of the world. We cannot say, as 
Berger does, that one's experience of truth "will never 
come to be seen as untruth" (139). The "hermeneutics 
of suspicion" of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud that makes 
up an essential part of the thinking of Heidegger and 
Derrida should have taught us by now that "experience" 
and "consciousness" are not unquestionable in this way; 
indeed, their very questionableness is what makes them 
significant (questionworthy). In addition, all in-
stances of conversion, and the founding of many relig-
ious traditions, would be incomprehensible if religious 
experience were not "thought" and thereby open to de-
bate. 
The emptiness of the traditional notion of relig-
ious experience emphasizes all the more the need to re-
consider religious thinking. In fact, religious think-
ing needs to be addressed and stressed more fully, to 
emphasize the need for inverting and reversing the old 
opposition between religious experience and religious 
thought as a prelude to, or indication of, the elimina-
tion of such an opposition. " H re again we may look 
to the erasure of the "is," for it does more than indi-
cate the destruction of the notion of substance and 
presence in the relation betwen religious experience 
and religious thinking. It also indicates that we are 
at the farthest reaches of our metaphysical language, 
on the edge of a language where it begins to break up. 
Hence in crossing out the "is" a border, a line, is 
marked, marking the way that is the fitting place of 
our thought. Here religious thinking is bound to work 
from within and without. Within, thinking works most 
faithfully and intimately and thereby corresponds 
Ientsprechen| to what has gone before by representing 
it. Yet such representation is not as traditionally 
thought, i.e., as the duplication, expression and ob-
ject! fication (however inadequate) of some fixed, fun-
damental standpoint or experience. Instead, there is a 
re-presentation in the sense of bringing-forth, of let-
ting meaning once again emerge and show itself by re-
sponding to and "speaking against" |ent-sprechenl what 
has been out of difference. Hence "thinking" works 
outside as well, an outside that it does not know nor 
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name because it is in the process of emerging and being 
created. Meaning emerges from the differing (from the 
past) and deferring (of the future), making thinking as 
much an "origin" (though this too is thought "sous 
rature"--under erasure—as indicated by the scare 
quotes) as the traditional notion of experience. But 
in fact where thinking is now an enactment of what it 
is about, 1* beginning and end, origin and future have 
little sense and indeed vanish in this marginal twi-
light zone. Indeed, both abiding in and creating this 
event of meaning |Ereignis1 amidst the play of dif-
ferences, on the cutting edge "between" what is thought 
and unthought, "between" past and future, we are in a 
place that is neither inside nor outside, neither 
peaceful homeland nor alien land of hostility, and are 
therefore denied the certainty of the rules that govern 
either side. Yet we are most faithful to ourselves and 
who we are by inhabiting this risky and ambiguous 
transgression that is always at work. Instead of will-
fully attempting to reappropriate the past and thereby 
maintain the status quo, we are only authentically our-
selves in giving up our (old) selves. 1 7 
The implications of this analysis for our under-
standing of religion and religious .traditions are var-
ied and far-reaching. For one thing, our understanding 
of the dynamics of religious traditions is greatly al-
tered. No longer a self-conscious, methodical attempt 
to match some original experience or discourse to 
changing circumstances through apology and justifica-
tion, religious traditions may now be seen as creative 
processes through which an understanding of the world 
(i.e., what is and is not possible) is brought-forth, 
ventured and revealed in and out of differing from 
other understandings "within" the tradition, and in and 
out of differing from other traditions as well. 
Tradition becomes a series of rifts, tears and trans-
gressions from which meaning emerges, a compilation of 
glosses that does not gloss over into an ever-present 
Meaning. This is an especially radical understanding 
for Western traditions, for it signals the end of the 
Book (as either arche or telos)--i.e., the end of a 
fully inscribed meaning, an ordered totality (authored 
by G o d ) 1 1 — a n d a resultant shifting and wandering of 
the locus of meaning from text to text. In fact, the 
paradigmatic tradition for this sort of understanding 
would undoubtedly be the Buddhist tradition, particu-
larly the Mahayana. With the disclosure of the empti-
ness of all truths (dharmas) by Nagarjuna and the 
Madhyamika school, that tradition found itself free 
from any attachment to a canon (i.e., the Pali canon) 
and allowed for the creation and proliferation of 
"scriptures" (and lack of scripture, as in the case of 
Zen) that serve as the inspiration for the varying and 
differing schools of Buddhism and gives the Mahayana 
tradition its peculiar dynamism. (Something of the 
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same sort, of course, has gone on in other traditions--
e.g., the proliferation of "authoritative" texts and 
commentaries in Judaism or Hinduism—though always un-
der the guise of being anchored in the true revelation 
of a book or person). Like Nagarjuna, our analysis 
notes that present religious thought is infected with 
an attachment—to some posited experience, discourse, 
or tradition—that is stifling and ultimately nihil-
istic, for it is an attachment to what is not there and 
never will be there (i.e., an attachment to nothing), 
but what we want to be there. The "rage for order," 
then, is not ''blessed" but diseased. Religious thought 
must become aware of the fact that the whole concept of 
tradition is tenuous at best, that it is less a thing 
to be grasped, defined and maintained (a whole, a 
totality) than a meaning that is realized as it is de-
fined. This, plus the understanding that theological 
work is as much gospel as the Gospels, puts an added 
burden and responsibility on the theologian and relig-
ious thinker, who, unsure of his tradition and place, 
must have the courage to lead, creating and proclaiming 
his message (if he has one) rather than giving us old 
wine in new skins. 
The extent to which that burden is being avoided 
today may be seen not only in the philosophers and the-
ologians we have already mentioned, but also, as al-
ready hinted, in the current discussion of the plural-
ity of religions. The responses to this problem of 
conflicting truth claims have generally sought conver-
gence of one sort or another, whether it be in a common 
referent (God, Ultimate Reality), transcendental cate-
gories or a common, underlying experience (faith). 
Levelling down the differences by which "experiences" 
and religious discourse are meaningful, such procedures 
render religion and religious traditions insignificant. 
Religious thinkers should instead be taking up the task 
of thinking in and out of the differences and conflicts 
of different traditions and "experiences," such that 
the plurality of religions becomes a bounty of possi-
bilities that challenge our thinking and the way we 
are.*' 
Another implication of understanding religious 
thinking as activity is that all religious practices 
and activities (including the "experience" of the sa-
cred) may be construed as a kind of thinking. This is 
not meant to "intellectualize" religious practice, 
since we have not sketched "thinking" in terms of 
logic, ratio or other method of the mind. On the con-
trary, we find ourselves in agreement with the general 
emphasis today that all the activities associated with 
religion, including the practice of theology, are on a 
par as attempts to bring-forth and show an understand-
ing of the world. However, since this precludes any 
straightforward division between theory and practice 
(since the theory is activity and the practice is 
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"thinking"), the defense and affirmation of a particu-
lar tradition or religion in general by appeal to the 
so-called "existential" level of religion (as in "You 
cannot really know what (Islam, Christianity, religion, 
etc.) means unless you are (a Muslim, a Christian, 
religious, etc.]," i.e., unless you practice religion) 
is no longer valid. A tradition does not escape criti-
cism by appealing to some existential level, because 
thinking is existential, and touches the heart of the 
understanding of a particular tradition. The only "de-
fense" of the tradition is a good offense (to the tra-
dition); a demonstration that shows the meaning-full-
ness of a tradition must be true to the openedness of 
human existence and the play of the world, rather than 
to a past which we "want to say" \Vouloir-dire—mean], 
which we want to be meaningful. 
Though this analysis has radically called into 
question the boundaries of such concepts as "religious 
experience" and "religious thought," our point has not 
been to simply do away with such terms; we may still 
wish to use such terms in certain situations. Instead, 
in the end, the whole point of this analysis has been 
to stress the risks and responsibilities of religious 
(and even "non-religious") thinkers in their particular 
practices and beliefs—risks and responsibilities that 
are all too often shunned these days. Positing some 
unquestionable origin or experience as the foundation 
of religious thought and tradition overlooks the fact 
that it is the thinker who is projecting and positing 
such an origin (i.e., that it originates with him as 
much as with anything else) and thereby avoids respon-
sibility for one 8 own actions. Such a procedure con-
tributes to the wish-fullfillment character of religion 
and, if strictly observed, leads to the insignificance 
and meaninglessness of religion and religious tradi-
tions. Religious thinkers and practitioners must begin 
to take responsibility for the meaning that they help 
create, and venture their proclamation (in word and/or 
deed) on the basis of where they find themselves situ-
ated, i.e., on the edge that is neither here nor there 
but always on the way. Only then will the world open 
up, and the light of the divine shine in. 
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